Does MENA Defy Gravity? How MENA has Performed in its Intraregional, EU and Other Trade: Implications for EU and Intra-MENA Trade Arrangements by NUGENT, Jeffrey B. & YOUSEF, Tarik M.
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES 
Does MENA Defy Gravity?  
How MENA has Performed in its Intraregional, EU and Other Trade:  
Implications for EU and Intra-MENA Trade Arrangements 
JEFFREY B. NUGENT AND TARIK M. YOUSEF
EUI Working Paper RSCAS No. 2005/26 
BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO DI FIESOLE (FI) 
 
 
All rights reserved. 
No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed or utilised 
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without  
the prior permission in writing from the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. 
 
Download and print of the electronic edition for teaching or research non commercial use is permitted 
on fair use grounds—one readable copy per machine and one printed copy per page. Each copy should 
include the notice of copyright. 
 
Permission for quotation should be addressed directly to the author(s). See contact details at end of text. 
Source should be acknowledged. 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© 2005 Jeffrey B. Nugent and Tarik M. Yousef 
Printed in Italy in October 2005 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Publications/
  
 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies carries out disciplinary and interdisciplinary 
research in the areas of European integration and public policy in Europe. It hosts the annual European 
Forum. Details of this and the other research of the centre can be found on: 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website: 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
Mediterranean Programme 
The Mediterranean Programme was set up at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the 
European University Institute in 1998. It focuses on the Mediterranean region. 
The Mediterranean Programme engages in research with the twin aims of: a) generating intellectually 
excellent scholarly work; and b) contributing to the general policy debate relating to the flows of 
persons, goods and ideas between and within the Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western 
Mediterranean areas in its four core fields of interest: EU–Mediterranean/Middle East Relations, 
Political Regimes, State, Economy and Society in the Middle East and North African, International 
Migration, Energy Relations in the Mediterranean region. 
The Mediterranean Programme and its activities have been financed by: Capitalia, Compagnia di San 
Paolo, Eni spa, Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, European Commission, European Investment 
Bank, Fondazione Monte dei Paschi di Siena, and Regione Toscana. 
The Annual Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting brings together scholars from across 
the region. 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Mediterranean/Meetings.shtml 
For further information: 
Mediterranean Programme 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
European University Institute 
Via delle Fontanelle, 19 
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy 
Fax: + 39 055 4685 770 
E-mail: MedProgSecretary@iue.it  
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Mediterranean/Index.shtml 

Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is three-fold: (1) to examine the extent to which trade of MENA countries, 
both intra-regional trade and extra-regional, has lived up to its potential based on the gravity model 
and other standard determinants of trade patterns, (2) to examine alternative explanations for such 
discrepancies, and (3) to offer quantitative simulations of the extent to which the existing patterns 
could be changed by alternative trade policy or regime scenarios such as strengthened intra-MENA 
trade and/or strengthened MENA-EU trade.  
Keywords 
Gravity Models, Bilateral Trade, GAFTA, Trade Diversion and Trade Creation 
 
 

EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2005/26 © 2005 Jeffrey B. Nugent and Tarik M. Yousef 
I. Introduction: The Pros and Cons of Intra-Regional and Extra-Regional Trade 
Arrangements∗ 
The purpose of this paper is three-fold: (1) to examine the extent to which trade of MENA countries, 
both intra-regional trade and extra-regional, has lived up to its potential based on a standard gravity 
model of the determinants of trade patterns, (2) to examine alternative explanations for such 
discrepancies, (3) to offer quantitative simulations of the extent to which the existing patterns would 
be changed by alternative trade policy and other scenarios, in particular, strengthened intra-MENA 
trade and/or strengthened MENU-EU trade.  
The first two purposes are primarily of interest because they are needed to be able to fulfill the third 
objective. Hence, we start with the rationale for it.  
In recent years there has been a considerable, though somewhat intermittent, rebirth of interest in 
inter-Arab or inter-MENA trade for at least three reasons (1) as a possible counterbalance to already 
initiated trade arrangements with Europe (the Euro-Med Agreements), (2) as a means of preparing for 
those trade arrangements and (3) as a more politically and socially acceptable means of maintaining 
some degree of openness and liberalization in the face of accumulated resentment arising from the 
presently very dim prospects for the peace process and cooperation between Israel, the Palestinians 
and the other nation states in the region.  
The focus for much of this interest is in the proposal for the Greater Arab Free Trade Association. 
But this isn’t the only form that greater intra-regional trade could take. It could be subregional (the 
Arab Maghreb Union, the Arab Common Market, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)) or 
alternatively broader inter-MENA as a whole. Also of interest is the effect of the EU itself in MENA 
trade. The key policy question to be answered is what would be the effects on EU-MENA trade and 
both other MENA trade and intra-MENA trade should intra-MENA trade be expanded? Similarly, 
what would be the effects on intra-MENA trade should EU-MENA trade be expanded?  
Different Analysts, Different Results, Lack of Comparability 
Nevertheless, despite a large number of papers and books on such matters (see below), there still exists 
considerable variation in views about the relative net benefits for MENA countries of pursuing either 
an inter-Arab (or inter-MENA) trade agreement or additional MENA-EU trade arrangements and the 
magnitude of the possible effects of either of these arrangements for MENA trade with all regions and 
for MENA economic growth. Some doubts about the desirability of emphasis on intra-MENA trade 
stem from the long history of failure in multilateral trading arrangements in the region (the Arab 
Common Market, other initiatives of the Arab League and the Council of Economic Unity, various 
subregional arrangements such as among Maghreb countries, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and the many 
bilateral trade agreements formed among countries of the region). Not only have these special 
arrangements been far from fully realized, but also even normal trade among countries of the region 
has been periodically and unexpectedly interrupted by trade boycotts, ad hoc border closings and so 
on. This implies that businesses set up to take advantage of regional trade have been adversely 
impacted by such failures. Without a radical change, it would therefore be better for businesses not to 
think about such trade in making their investment and production decisions.  
                                                     
∗  Paper presented in Workshop 1 ‘Economic Policies to Stimulate Trade and Investment Co-operation among the EU’s 
Mediterranean Partner Countries’ of the 3rd Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, Italy March 
20-24, 2002. 
The authors express their appreciation for the collaboration of Rania Miniesy in previous work and to Grace Lim and Paul 
Hughes for their research assistance. They also greatly appreciate the comments of Riad al Khouri, Alfred Tovias, Inon 
Dafni, Bernd Lucke, Maria Giovanna Bosco and other participants in the workshop for useful comments on an earlier draft. 
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Yet, if they have failed in adhering to intra-regional trade agreements, will MENA countries do any 
better in the case of EU-Mediterranean arrangements? How much trade creation as opposed to trade 
diversion will free trade arrangements (FTAs) with the EU have?  
Doubts about the wisdom of FTAs and customs unions (CUs) promoting intraregional trade also 
derive from the economic integration theory literature. This literature points to the possibilities for 
welfare-reducing trade diversion of free trade agreements, especially in conditions not unlike those of 
the MENA region where differences in factor endowments are relatively small, tariff rates vary 
considerably from one country to another, technological efficiency is relatively low and differences in 
wage rates are relatively small. In addition, the past experience with such arrangements, in developing 
countries at least, suggests that there could well be conflict-generating polarization effects, given the 
relatively large differences in initial levels of income, market size and policy environments of 
relevance to trade and competitiveness among countries in the MENA and other regions of developing 
countries (LDCs). Finally, since factor movements (of both labor and capital) are rather high among 
countries of the region, and factor movements can substitute for trade, some feel that such flows 
undermine the basis for trade within the region. Some have even argued that the promotion of factor 
movements is a better way of achieving regional integration than trade. Even at best, many see 
regional trading arrangements as coming at the expense of the more advantageous broader multilateral 
trading arrangements (such as those within the WTO).  
Since there are many different positive as well as negative effects that need to be considered in any 
such assessment and relevant environmental conditions vary considerably from one country to another 
and over time, different analyses may arrive at rather different conclusions. Typically, they have.  
Another reason why various analysts, policy makers and policy advisors have come to very 
different conclusions about the relative merits of intraregional and extraregional FTAs and CUs has 
been the use of different models and different data sets.  
For example, a common form of modelling of such issues has been through computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models.1 Since these models are highly dependent on many modelling assumptions 
and parameter estimates of unknown realism, not surprisingly different modellers have derived 
different conclusions about the effects of trade policy from these models. In many cases, moreover, the 
results derived from these models are more attributable to modelling features than to trade issues. In 
fact, the trade scenarios used in simulating such models are typically very naïve and based on ad hoc 
assumptions about how future trade patterns would be affected by alternative trade policies and 
strategies. Another issue that arises with CGE models is whether it is better to use national models or 
world models. Indeed, the results from single country CGE models are often very different than those 
obtained from multi-country or world models. Given the long lead-time needed to set up and calibrate 
such models, each such CGE modelling effort requires a large data base that is almost inevitably 
seriously outdated for use in the period to which it is to be applied. The sizable investment of time and 
expertise involved has resulted in different institutions in different parts of the world developing 
different modelling assumptions and data bases. Hence, in comparing different results for the same 
question obtained by different research teams, seldom is it possible to distinguish the effects of 
different modelling assumptions from those of different data sets. 
Many of the parameter values used in CGE models are merely guesses. Even if they are estimates 
based on micro data sets or time series analysis, seldom is concern given to issues of specification 
bias, errors in variables, identification problems, multicollinearity, etc. Moreover, as indicated above, 
many of the parameters that are estimated (as opposed to only assumed) are often based on single 
                                                     
1  Hertel (1997) provides a rather encyclopedic description of the construction and application of CGE models to 
international trade and Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) a survey of the empirical literature on the application of CGE 
models to regional economic integration in particular. 
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observations, e.g., an average input-output coefficient from a social accounting matrix (SAM table) for 
a particular (usually badly outdated) year. 
The estimates of trade flows obtained from world econometric models (like Project Link or other 
simpler versions of econometric and simulation models) suffer from similar problems, again limiting 
the comparability of their results and raising serious methodological questions as to the internal 
consistency of the models and the validity of any conclusions drawn.2  
Use of the Gravity Model and Standard International Data 
In order to help put the analysis of such effects of different types of trade strategies on a firmer basis, 
the present study focuses on the determinants of trade patterns within a world setting, based on trade 
flows between each pair of countries in the world over the period 1970-1992. This is an updated 
version of a large trade matrix that has now been used in a number of the studies referred to below.  
Further, in order to generate the predicted or potential trade flows for comparing to the actual trade 
flows, we also make use of a model that has been widely used in the applied trade literature. This is 
the gravity model. Gravity models focus on the effects on trade patterns of the geographic distance 
between, and respective market sizes, of each pair of trading partners. Important advantages of the 
gravity model are its relatively high explanatory power and its modest data requirements. 
One study using a gravity model applied to some countries of the MENA region is that of Ekholm 
et al. (1996). This study, which happens to use somewhat similar methods as in the present study, has 
argued that the potential for trade growth within the region, even within a more peaceful one, is quite 
small. This study computed four sets of predicted to actual export ratios (across all trade partners in 
the sample) for twelve MENA countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). One of these was intra-regional on the basis of no 
integration, another intra-regional with full intra-MENA integration, and a third for trade of each 
individual MENA country with EU countries as a whole, and fourth trade with EU countries but in this 
case assuming full integration with the EU. For no MENA countries was full intra-regional integration 
found to increase the predicted to actual ratio of exports by more than 15 percent. In most countries, 
moreover, the predicted to actual export ratio is below unity, indicating that intra-MENA trade is 
already larger than might be expected on the basis of country income, distance and various other 
transaction cost variables.3 The results for the trade levels of individual MENA countries with all other 
countries are quite similar as far as the impact of economic integration is concerned, but are quite 
different4 from those obtained from the intra-regional data.  
These calculations were made on the basis of parameter estimates obtained from a different set of 
countries and then applied to data for the explanatory variables taken from MENA and other countries. 
To estimate the parameters, the authors use a gravity model equation along the lines of that used in the 
next section but with a smaller set of explanatory variables.5 They estimate the parameters of the 
model on the basis of cross section data for the year 1989 (that year being deemed to be a normal trade 
year for MENA and other countries) from a relatively small set of countries, 13 developed countries6 
                                                     
2  For example, in large models of this sort it is obviously impossible to estimate all variables simultaneously. Usually a bloc 
procedure is used with little information about the reliability of the assumptions made in the use of such simplifying procedures. 
3  Fischer (1993) was also pessimistic about the prospects of increased trade through integration within the MENA region.  
4  In particular, the predicted to actual trade levels are typically much larger than unity. 
5  Specifically, the explanatory variables included are the GDP’s and GDP’s per capita of each trading partner, distance, 
difference in mean years of schooling, the shares of primary products in total exports of both countries, common 
language, common border and a dummy variable for membership in the European Community.  
6  The developed countries in the sample are Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. 
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and 11 developing countries.7 The latter sample includes only relatively open countries whose trade 
values would not have been suppressed or distorted. Being quite restrictive in coverage, the total 
sample amounts to only 469 observations. While most of the parameter estimates were of the expected 
sign and magnitude and were statistically significant (at the five percent level), certain key ones were 
not, namely, the coefficients of common language and European Community. Both of these variables 
have been found to have had positive and significant effects on bilateral trade flows in other studies 
but in this one, neither was statistically significant and very small in magnitude. The small size and 
lack of significance of the latter was obviously of considerable importance since it was the coefficient 
used to simulate the effect of complete intra-regional integration.  
The small size of the sample, the fact that most countries in the sample were rich (either developed or 
high income developing countries), that EC countries make up a significant portion of the sample, could 
contribute to the explanation for why the integration variable is so small and insignificant compared to 
estimates obtained in other studies and why the intra-MENA trade values were so large relative to the 
values predicted from the gravity model. Moreover, other studies using more traditional Vinerian 
methods have been much more optimistic about the potential for increased trade in the MENA region.8 
 We specify a gravity model that is more general, includes additional measures than in the Ekholm 
et al (1996) model. Instead of including only a small set of countries for a single year, neither of which 
may be very representative, we use the experience of virtually all countries in the world and for a 
number of different years taken at the decades of the 70s, 80s and 90s. We also attempt to greatly 
mitigate or even altogether eliminate the problems of endogeneity and uncertain directions of causality 
that often arise in the use of models when trade variables depend on variables that may be endogenous, 
such as GDP, relative prices, demand patterns or even policy variables like tariffs and quotas which 
are also endogenous within a political economy framework.  
The gravity model is used as the basis for simulating the levels of trade that would be predicted 
among each pair of countries, including the MENA countries, under alternative assumptions about trade 
regimes and other conditions. This allows us to determine the extent to which actual trade flows among 
partners exceeds or falls below those that would be expected. The general finding is that MENA 
countries tend to trade less than would be expected on the basis of the gravity model, especially so in 
the case of intra-regional trade. Different estimating equations are used and alternative regimes 
assumed in making these predictions. In particular, we examine the effects of two scenarios, the Euro-
Med trade agreements and an FTA among Arab or MENA countries, independently as well as jointly.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II outlines the methodology and its 
application to the questions at hand, including the data sources. Section III presents some results obtained 
from the gravity model, and summarizes the answers to the first two objectives of the paper. Section IV 
contains the simulations and derives conclusions concerning the third objective. Section V concludes.  
II. The Gravity Model and its Application to Bilateral Trade of the MENA and Other 
Regions 
To help answer the question concerning the extent to which actual intraregional trade patterns of 
MENA countries differ from those that would be expected on the basis of standard determinants of 
trade, we need a standard model of bilateral trade flows that would allow us to draw on the experience 
of the world as a whole for a reasonable number of years at different points in time. For such a model, 
we use the well-known ‘gravity model’ developed in the 1960s and which has been extremely widely 
                                                     
7  These are: Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea (South) , Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Uruguay.  
8  For example, Zarrouk (1992) estimated that the elimination of tariff barriers in the MENA region would induce intra-
regional trade to grow somewhere between 4 and 8 percent per annum faster over the first ten years faster than it would 
without such an action. See also Abed (2000) and El-Naggar (1992).  
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applied ever since.9 The use of the gravity model is especially attractive in this context because of its 
demonstrated applicability to many different kinds of countries and regions, its robustness over time, 
and to various different specifications. According to this model, the trade flows between any pair of 
countries should be affected by their mass (the product of their respective GDPs) as well as by the 
distance between them.10 The latter is because transport and transaction costs can be assumed to rise 
with distance. Since factors such as exchange rate variability, common language, common colonial or 
other historical experience, common currency, free trade agreement, having a common border can 
affect these transaction or transportation costs, all such variables can be included in the gravity model.  
While hypotheses concerning the importance of trade for growth have been popular for many 
years, they remain very controversial since the construction of tests of the impact of trade on income 
growth have been subject to obvious problems of simultaneity and causality. The gravity model has 
received considerable recent attention in this context since it permits a measure of openness to trade 
that is not dependent on potentially endogenous variables. Actual exports and/or imports would 
depend heavily on income itself and also on tariff rates and quotas. Even tariffs and quotas are 
endogenous in a political economy sense. To get around this long-standing problem, Frankel and 
Romer (1999) used a gravity model containing only exogenous variables as instruments in order to 
‘predict’ trade in relation to GDP. The employed data for the year 1985 from 150 countries to estimate 
the parameters of the gravity model and then used the estimated parameters to predict the trade flows 
for that year. The results were then used as the new and improved measure of openness to be inserted 
into a standard cross-country model for the level of per capita GDP. Other variables included 
investment rates, population, area and in some cases other variables suggested in standard cross 
country growth models. The relationship between the new and improved measure of openness and per 
capita income (or growth) was shown to be positive and significant.  
Recent papers by Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (2000) have applied just such a model to 
bilateral aggregate trade flows for a large incomplete panel data set of 186 countries for five year 
intervals between 1970 and 1990. These authors compiled the relevant data on all the relevant 
variables and have made that data set available to other researchers. For this reason we make use of 
this data but extend it in three important directions. First, we extend it in time to 1992, based on the 
international trade matrix for 1992 put together by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(Feenstra, Lipsey and Bowen 1997). Second, we fill in several thousand observations that were 
missing in the original data set with information from more recent standard international sources, 
especially for explanatory variables like country size, distance and for MENA countries whose 
coverage was rather spotty in the original data set. Third, we extend it by disaggregating the trade 
matrices of each year from the aggregate flows constructed by Rose and his colleagues into energy 
(specifically oil and gas flows) and non-energy subtotals.  
Rose (2000) found the results of the basic gravity model to be strong and to be remarkably robust 
to alternative specifications such as the inclusion of other variables or alternative measures of some of 
the included variables. Among the additional variables were regional dummy variables, the product of 
the two countries’ tariff rates, a dummy variable for whether one of the countries is landlocked, the 
sum or products of the two countries’ land areas, and dummy variables for one or both countries 
having controls on the current account and foreign exchange surrender and for one (or both) being an 
island economy. Yet, since few of these variables turned out to be either very significant or to affect 
the other results in any substantial way, these variables are excluded from the present specification.  
                                                     
9  See for example, Anderson 1975, Bergstrand 1985, Deardorff (1998), McCallum 1995, Rose (2000) and numerous other 
references contained therein. To our knowledge, however, the only previous studies that have used the gravity model in 
the context of the Middle East have been Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000), Limam and Abdalla (1999) and Sayan (1998). 
Their results are of limited usefulness either because they either focused on aggregate trade flows for one period or 
utilized small samples of countries and few explanatory variables. 
10  As noted by Rose (2000), Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, p. 1384) attribute to the gravity model ‘some of the clearest and 
most robust empirical findings in economics’.  
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Specifically, we first specify the model as follows:  
  
 Ln (Xijt) = β0 + β1 Yijt + εijt 
where i and j denotes the two trade partner countries, t denotes year, and the variables are defined as 
follows: Xij denotes the value of bilateral trade between i and j; Yijt is a vector of characteristics 
concerning the same two trading partners at time t and εijt is the error term. The variables included in 
the vector Y are the product of the real GDPs of i and j, the product of their per capita GDPs, the 
distance between the two trading partners, dummy variables for each of the following: sharing a 
common border (Cont), common language (Lang), a regional trade arrangement (FTA), a common 
nation (ComNat), the same colonizer after 1945 (ComCol), colonial relationship (Colony), currency 
(CU), and the volatility of the exchange rate between their currencies (V) within each five year period.  
This is the specification that we have used in a preceding paper (Miniesy, Nugent and Yousef, 
2001). The results with this specification are reproduced in Table 1 for each different period, i.e., 1970, 
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 as well as for the pooled sample. Note that for each period there were 
at least 4000 observations and the pooled sample contains over 27,000 observations. Note also that, 
although the magnitude of the parameter estimates varies somewhat from one sample to another, with 
perhaps a single exception the signs of the coefficients do not vary across samples. The numbers in 
parentheses below the corresponding parameter values are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. In virtually every case, the estimated coefficient has the sign expected according to the 
gravity model, i.e., negative for exchange rate volatility and distance and positive for all the others. In 
most cases, moreover, as indicated by the asterisks next to the coefficients, the coefficients are all 
significant at the 5 percent level or below. The value of adjusted R2 varies from 0.57 to 0.73, indicating 
explanatory power comparable to that obtained by Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (2001).  
In this paper, however, we make use of some additional gravity-type variables that are available in 
the Rose (2000) data set. These include: Distance squared (D2ij or DISTSQ) , Landlocked (LL), sum of 
the areas (SAREA), sum of the tariffs (TARS) and dummy variables if one of the partners is an oil 
exporter (ONEOIL), or if both partners are oil exporters (BOTHOIL). Finally, subsequently, to 
capture possible trade-diverting effects of both FTAs and currency unions, we include dummy 
variables if only one partner is a member (ONEFTA), and ONECU). Irrespective of the specific 
variables included on the right hand side, this shall be called equation (1).  
Alternatively, the dependent variable could be the bilateral trade flows relative to the product of the 
GDPs in which case the ln(YiYj) term is removed from the right hand side. This has the effect of 
removing the most important source of endogeneity in the equation. By comparing the results of both 
specifications in Frankel and Romer (1999), however, it can be seen that there is a price to be paid for 
this in terms of a lower R2. This specification shall be referred to as equation (2).  
  The trade matrix data set used is reported to cover 98% of all international (broadly defined) 
trade. The 1970-90 values of the GDP at constant prices, distance, contiguity, common language and 
other transaction cost measures are taken from Rose (2000) based on Penn World Tables (5.6), World 
Development Indicators and other sources. The 1992 values for GDP, population and other variables 
are taken from standard sources such as the World Bank’s World Development Report (for 1995), 
World Development Indicators. Detailed sources for the earlier years are given in Rose (2000). The 
exchange rate volatility index was computed as the standard deviation of the first difference of the 
monthly natural log of the bilateral exchange rate (based on line ‘ae’ from the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics in the preceding five years). As in Rose, the EEC/EC, 
NAFTA, EFTA, Australia/New Zealand, ASEAN, CACM, CARICOM, PATCRA, SPARTECA, 
Cartagena Agreement (Andean Group) and Israel/US Free Trade Agreements are all treated as 
examples of FTAs and hence signified by values of 1 in the FTA dummy variable. Significantly, Rose 
did not include any of the aforementioned trade arrangements among MENA countries as examples of 
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FTAs. Presumably, this was because their effectiveness was deemed to be too slight to be treated on 
an equal footing with those other arrangements.  
By drawing on the two data sources for the trade matrix and the other identified sources for the 
explanatory variables, for purposes of this paper we arrive at a somewhat more complete panel of 
observations on the aggregate trade flows between each pair of countries (for 186 countries) for the years 
1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1992.11 Virtually all the other data (GDP, population, area, language, 
geographic distance, contiguity, colonial background, FTAs, currency unions and tariffs) is taken from 
Rose (2000) or from the large data bank available from the World Bank’s website or as a last resort for 
GDP data from the United Nations MEDS data set. The expansion of the data set from that used in Rose 
(2000) and Miniesy, Nugent and Yousef (2001) is largely for MENA countries and their trade partners. 
As indicated above CU and FTA dummy variables are used to capture the effects of existing 
currency unions or other arrangements which may have affected trade patterns of some or all 
countries. Past users of the gravity model have estimated the effects of FTAs and currency unions in 
some detail, but as far as we know, (with the exception of one study limited to NAFTA) none have 
attempted to capture any of the trade diversion effects arising from these partial and inherently 
discriminatory arrangements. Failing to do so clearly implies that existing estimates of the benefits of 
FTA participation may be overestimates.  
As indicated by the form of equation (1), the model is loglinear in the continuous variables so that 
the estimated coefficients represent elasticities, i.e., percentage changes in the bilateral trade values 
with respect to given percentage changes in the continuous explanatory variables (such as products of 
the respective GDPs). The parameters of the dummy variables indicate the percentage change in the 
dependent variable attributable to a unit increase in the dummy variable (from ‘0’ to ‘1’). An 
idiosyncrasy of this data set is that only positive trade flows are reported. In other words, for those cells 
in the matrix for which no bilateral trade is reported, no information on the explanatory variables is 
provided. Presumably, this is because the authors suspected that in fact there were some trade flows but 
that the information was missing. As a result, the parameters can be estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS) just as they were by Frankel and Romer (1999), Frankel and Rose (2001) and Rose (2000).  
Estimates of equation (1) for the enlarged pooled sample based on the extended gravity model that 
includes the additional variables are given in Table 2. In this and subsequent cases, we present the 
coefficients in the first column and t values based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors in the second columns. The parameter values and t-values for total trade are given in the first two 
columns, for oil trade in the second pair of columns and for non-oil trade in the third pair of columns. 
At the bottom of each column are: the number of observations (N) and the values of adjusted R2.  
Comparing the estimates across columns of the table, it can be seen that the explanatory power of 
the gravity model is much stronger for total trade and especially non-oil trade than for oil trade. This is 
hardly surprising since oil trade is often between countries very distant from one another. Note that in 
the total trade specification virtually all variables in the model have the expected signs and are highly 
statistically significant. The logs of bilateral trade flows are highly and positively responsive to the 
product of both the respective GDPs and GDPs per capita while the effect of the distance variable 
(lnD) is negative and significant. Similarly, all the transaction cost-reducing variables, such as 
currency union (CU), contiguity, common language, Free Trade Arrangement (FTA), same nation, 
same colonizer and same colonial relationship, have positive and highly significant effects on the 
bilateral trade flows whereas the transaction cost-increasing variables (V, LL and SAREA) have 
highly significant negative effects. While the three added variables all have significant effects on the 
lnXiXj trade variable, their inclusion with the somewhat enlarged data set (with 35621 observations 
                                                     
11  A recent application of the gravity model to the evaluation of the effects of intraregional trade arrangements on 
extraregional trade arrangements by Al-Mashat 2000 for NAFTA showed these effects to be much more positive than 
suggested in the standard trade literature.  
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instead of 27,291) does not increase the explanatory power of the model relative to that for the smaller 
sample shown in Table 1. Notice that the effect of distance squared (captured by the coefficient of 
lnD2 or quadratic distance term) is negative but much smaller in absolute value than the linear term. 
Not only is the explanatory power of the model virtually identical to that in Table 1 but most of the 
other parameter values are rather similar in magnitude to the estimates from the pooled data set in 
Table 1. Some partial exceptions are the coefficients of CU, lnD and lnYiYj which are somewhat 
smaller and those of Cont and Lang which are somewhat larger (in absolute terms).  
As in Miniesy, Nugent and Yousef (2001) the explanatory power of the model for Energy or Oil 
Trade is much lower than for either total trade or non-energy trade. The value of adjusted R2 is only 
0.248. The directions of the effects of the D, Lang, FTA and CU terms are now opposite to those 
expected. This would seem to be because bilateral trade in oil is obviously primarily between those 
countries with oil and those countries without oil. Since countries that are close together are not likely 
to be trade partners in this respect, countries that are farther away from each other and not both 
members of the same CUs or FTAs are more likely to have bilateral trade in oil. For the same reason, 
the effect of Cont is somewhat weaker in the case of oil trade. On the other hand, the common colonial 
background variables remain very large and positive and both D2 and LL have negative influences, the 
latter a very large and highly significant one. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the results of the extended gravity model are especially strong for non-
energy or non-oil trade. The value of R2 is slightly larger and the coefficients of lnYiYj, Lang, FTA, 
CU, ComNat, and Colony are all larger, positive and more highly significant whereas the influences of 
D and LnSAREA are more strongly negative. Note, however, that in this case the coefficient of D2 is 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level.  
To examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications and sample sizes in subsequent 
tables (Tables 3-5) we present the results for different specifications and data sets. The results in Table 
3 are based on essentially the same extended gravity model as in Table 2 but including also TARS (the 
sum of the tariff rates between each pair of trading partners i and j). Since the data on tariff rates, 
especially for the earlier sample years of countries, is quite incomplete, this has the effect of reducing 
the number of available observations to 15,992 for total trade, 6586 for oil trade, and 15,734 for non-
oil trade. Due to a high correlation between the tariff rate variable (TARS) and Cont for this data set, 
the Cont variable had to be omitted from the model. TARS is also fairly highly correlated with D. For 
this smaller data set, the values of the adjusted R2 are slightly higher for each set of estimates in this 
table than for the comparable models in Table 2. In other respects, however, the results are quite 
similar. As expected, TARS has a negative effect on bilateral trade flows in all three types of trade, 
significantly negative for both total trade and non-oil trade. Another difference is that the coefficient 
of the linear distance term (LnD) in each case is much weaker and even positive for all three types of 
trade. This is compensated, however, by the fact that the coefficient of the quadratic distance term 
(LnD2 ) is now more strongly negative in each case. 
To retain the larger and sample and to avoid potential endogeneity in the use of TARS as an 
explanatory variable, in Table 4 we exclude TARS and return to the larger sample of 35,621 (for total 
trade). Given, the much poorer application of the simple gravity model to energy trade and the fact 
that quite a few MENA countries are in fact energy exporters, the specification used in generating the 
results of this table includes two additional dummy variables for being an energy exporter. ONEOIL 
takes the value of 1 if only one of the trade partners is an oil exporter (and the value of 0 in all other 
cases). BOTHOIL takes a value of unity if both trade partners are oil exporters (and 0 in all other 
cases). We would expect the coefficient of ONEOIL to be positive in the case of oil trade and 
ambiguous in other trade types and that of BOTHOIL to be negative in all cases. Since oil export 
depends on being well-endowed in this form of natural resources, it can safely be assumed to be 
exogenous to the level of trade flows.  
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For total and non-energy trade, the inclusion of these variables has the effect of increasing the 
explanatory power modestly, sharpening some of the other effects. More importantly, both variables 
(but especially BOTHOIL) have significant negative effects on bilateral trade values for total and non-
energy trade. For energy trade, however, the increased explanatory power is more substantial and as 
expected the ONEOIL dummy has a highly significant positive effect. The effect of BOTHOIL is once 
again negative and significant. Hence, the relatively large energy endowments among MENA 
countries may contribute to the explanation for why MENA countries trade less than might otherwise 
be expected on the basis of the simpler version of the gravity model.  
Next, to deal more thoroughly with the possibility of trade diversion, the specification in Table 5 
for all trade adds two new dummy variables, one for ‘One Trader in an FTA or ONEFTA’ and another 
for ‘One Trader in a CU or ONECU’. Note from the results given in both columns of the table (i.e., 
with and without the oil export dummy variables) that the coefficient of the former is negative and 
significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that there is indeed a small but significant trade diversion 
effect. In the case of a currency union, however, no such effect is evident. The other coefficients, 
however, are left largely unaffected. Some minor exceptions are that the coefficients of both ComNat 
and CU are increased at least to a moderate extent. Note that the inclusion of the Trade diversion terms 
slightly raises the adjusted R2.  
Finally, since the variables involving GDP on the right hand side of equation (1) are potentially 
endogenous, to eliminate this source of simultaneous equation bias and reversed causality (trade also 
raising GDP), in Table 6 we present some results based on estimating equation (2) In this case, GDP 
has been moved to the product of the GDPs has been moved to the left hand side of the equation. The 
variable to be explained is the log of bilateral trade less the log of the product of the GDPs. As can be 
seen by comparing the results of the two equations, the effect is a large reduction in explanatory 
power. Since these product of GDP and GDP per capita terms were among the strongest and most 
significant of the explanatory variables in the estimates of equation (1), this is probably not surprising. 
Nevertheless, there is remarkably little change in most of the other results. Not a single coefficient has 
a change in sign or significance and in most cases the magnitudes of the coefficients are only very 
slightly affected. There is some change however, in the magnitudes of the CU and FTA variables. The 
effects of both CU (for both countries being members of the same currency union) and ‘One Trader in 
CU’ are increased and the latter becomes statistically significant. In the case of FTA, however, the 
effect (although not terribly large in magnitude) is the opposite. In other words, the positive effect of 
both partners being in the same FTA is reduced and the negative effect of only one being in the FTA 
becomes more strongly negative and significant. Thus, in removing this remaining source of 
endogeneity bias, it becomes clearer that currency unions are in fact trade creating (both intra-
regionally and extra-regionally) but that FTAs can be both trade creating and trade-diverting as 
suggested by traditional customs union theory.  
Since tariffs and tariff-equivalent quotas have been excluded from the results of Tables 5 and 6, in 
Table 7 we examine the extent to which the variation in our tariff rate measures contribute to the 
aforementioned explanation for the tendency for MENA countries to export less than would be expected 
on the basis of the simple gravity model without tariffs. Specifically, we regress the residuals from each 
of the trade equations reported in Table 5 on the sum of the tariff rates of the trading partners and various 
other barriers to trade. The latter include controls on the capital account transactions, controls on current 
account transactions and the requirement of an exporter to surrender export proceeds to the Central 
Bank. The results are presented in the corresponding columns of Table 7. Because there is some 
correlation among the various regulatory measures across countries, the estimates are presented in 
three different panels. The first (Panel A) includes (on the right hand side of the estimating equation) 
only the tariff rates, the second (Panel B) the full set of variables, and the third (Panel C) all the others 
but excluding the tariff rates. Although the inclusion of all variables together (as in Panel B) has the 
effect of reducing the magnitude of some of the coefficients, the explanatory power (measured by the 
Adjusted R2 ) is higher for these models than for the others. Note also that each type of barrier has a 
Jeffrey B. Nugent and Tarik M. Yousef 
10 EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2005/26 © 2005 Jeffrey B. Nugent and Tarik M. Yousef 
negative and significant on the residual, consistent with the notion that such barriers may be the 
explanations for the under-achievement of trade by MENA countries, especially among each other.  
A major shortcoming of the results presented above are that the data used is rather dated, being 
based on data going back to 1970 but none more recent than 1992. While as mentioned above, this is 
because the large and internally consistent and PPP adjusted data set that has now been made available 
to researchers through the efforts of the NBER and Rose (2000), trade matrices can be constructed 
based on information from the IMF’s Direction of Trade, at the aggregate level at least, for more 
recent years and again linked up with national accounts and other data from standard international 
sources, even if not entirely consistent with that for the earlier period. Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) 
have done this for 18 Arab countries and 43 other countries that make up over 90 percent of trade of 
Arab countries for the years 1995-1997. The dependent variable in this case is the average value of the 
bilateral trade over the years 1995-97 and explanatory variables are many of the same ones used above 
inspired by the gravity model. By restricting the country coverage and averaging over three years, they 
are better able to distinguish between zeros and missing values in the bilateral trade flows. Whereas 
the data set used above and based on Rose (2000) had no zero observations for bilateral trade, Al-
Atrash and Yousef report that almost 15 percent of the entries in their bilateral trade matrix were 
indeed zero. For this reason, they employ a Tobit procedure instead of OLS used in the other studies.  
The maximum likelihood estimates obtained by Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000, Tables 4 and 5) are 
reproduced here as Tables 8 and 9. Their set of explanatory variables was somewhat smaller and 
different from that used above and their data set (3718 observations) was much smaller and limited to 
that of particular relevance to the Arab countries. For example, they distinguish between various 
different FTAs instead of using a single FTA dummy for all. They also distinguish between reporting 
country and partner country characteristics, different common languages and subregions within 
MENA. Hence, their results are by no means closely comparable to those reported in the preceding 
tables. Nevertheless, from the columns labeled ‘Trade’ in both tables, one can see much the same 
patterns in the results and a very similar value of R2. In particular, notice that the coefficients of 
distance, common border, GDP are identical in sign and similar in magnitude and significance to the 
corresponding values reported in preceding tables. As in Table 1 above, the effects of membership in 
the AMU and GCC (Table 8) have strong negative (as opposed to positive effects) very different from 
other FTAs. So too do the dummy variables for oil exporter (Arab2) and for both countries being Arab 
countries (Arab3) in Table 8. Some slight differences are in the effects of GDP per capita for the 
reporting country (having a negative and significant influence in Table 9) and the coefficient of the 
‘Openness’ measure for the partner country (which is negative and significant in Table 9). In general, 
however, it would seem that, despite the differences between the data and methods used in Tables 8 
and 9 from those used in Tables 1-7, the main findings of the gravity model would seem to be as 
applicable in the late 1990s as in the earlier years.  
III. Simulations of the Differences between Actual and Predicted Bilateral Trade Flows 
with Different Modelling Assumptions and Policy Scenarios  
The purpose of this section is to address the question posed in the title of the paper and the third 
purpose of the paper.  
Hints to the effect that MENA does defy gravity—in the sense of not trading as much as would be 
expected on the basis of the gravity model—have already appeared in that: (1) the Arab countries in 
general and the AMU, ACM and GCC all have negative and significant dummy variables in the 
aforementioned regressions for bilateral trade, (2) substantial gaps between actual and predicted 
MENA trade were obtained in the earlier analyses of Miniesy, Nugent and Yousef (2001) for 1992 and 
of Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000). On the other hand, we have also seen that adding some additional 
variables like dummy variables for oil endowments and to allow for possible trade diversion effects 
when only one country of any trading pair is a member of a particular FTA or CU might well have the 
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effect of lowering the predicted values of trade for some MENA countries. If so, this would mean that 
the aforementioned gaps may have been overestimated, but also confirming the fact that trade 
diverting effects of FTAs elsewhere have had the effect of lowering MENA trade.  
Columns of (1)-(4) of Table 10 provide some comparisons based on the pooled 1970-92 regression 
results presented above. Column (1) provides the actual intra-regional trade of the Arab portion of the 
MENA region as a whole for each year. In other words, the first four rows of the table provide the sum 
of the bilateral trade flows among Arab countries in the data base from Rose (2000) for the years 
1980, 1985, 1990 and 1992, respectively. The absolute values are not exactly comparable with each 
other across years because the number of cells (indicated in the ‘No. Obs.’ column) in the trade matrix 
for which there exists data varies from one year to another. As mentioned above, the other data for 
predicting such trade is available only for those trade cells with data. Hence, the values of actual and 
predicted are based on the same number of observations and therefore are more comparable one to 
another for any given year than over time. Columns (2)-(4) provide the predicted values of such trade 
under alternative specifications of the gravity model. Those in column (2) are based on the parameter 
estimates of the extended gravity model presented in the first column of Table 2. Those in column (3) 
are based on the parameter estimates of the extended gravity model with the oil dummy variables 
added given in the first column of Table 4. Those given in column (4) are based on the parameter 
estimates presented in the first column of Table 5, i.e., a specification which includes both the oil 
dummy variables and the trade diversion variables ONEFTA and ONECU.  
Subsequent rows in the table present the same figures for MENA trade with other regions, the EU 
in the second set of four rows, followed by NAFTA , OOECD, LDCs and EE, respectively, in the 
remaining sets of rows in the table.  
Focusing first on the comparisons of columns (1) and (2), the latter based on the regressions based 
on the first panel of Table 2, one can see that the direction of the difference or gaps varies from year to 
year as well as region to region. In 1980, the year at which oil prices were at their peak in real terms, 
actual MENA trade exceeded the predicted value in the EU, NAFTA, OOECD, and LDCs, in most of 
these cases by a considerable margin. Only for the MENA region itself and Eastern Europe did the 
actual trade fall short of the predicted values and in neither case by as much as 50 percent. Yet, for the 
year 1992 and for each region, MENA’s trade fell short of that predicted by the basic extended version 
of the gravity model. The predictions of column (3) take into account the ONEOIL and BOTHOIL 
dummy variables that provide a crude way of incorporating natural resource endowments in the form 
of energy reserves. These were based on the predictions of equation (1) based on the regressions 
presented in Table 4. The inclusion of these variables has the effect of reducing the predicted values of 
trade in every year and region relative to the base model predictions. Note, however, that the 
reductions are much smaller for intraregional trade than for extraregional trade. 
Column (4) provides the predictions based on the regression equation (1) in which the variables 
ONEFTA and ONECU are also included, i.e., based on the results presented in the first column of 
Table 5. Note that this change very substantially reduces the predicted trade of Arab MENA countries 
with each other and all other regions. In other words, it appears that all their trade flows are very 
significantly reduced by the trade diversion of FTAs in other parts of the world. Hence, modification 
of the gravity model to account for both endowments of natural resources and trade diversion from 
existing FTAs (most importantly ASEAN, NAFTA and the EU) has the effect of substantially 
reducing the values of trade predicted by the gravity model. Whereas the comparison of columns (1) 
and (2) for 1992 showed the predicted to exceed the actual trade values of MENA countries with every 
region, comparing (1) with (4) shows this to be no longer the case for NAFTA, OECD, and LDCs. 
Overall, however, and for the MENA, EU and EE regions, there remain gaps between the predicted 
and actual trade of MENA countries, suggesting that in 1992, the MENA countries were indeed 
underachievers in international trade.  
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To facilitate further comparisons the figures presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 are copied 
from columns (1) and (4) of Table 10. Those in column (3) are simulated values of the various MENA 
trade patterns based on the modelling assumptions of column (2) but assuming that MENA would have 
a full-fledged FTA. Notice the big jump in intra-MENA trade resulting from this scenario and rather 
modest changes in the trade flows with other regions. The projections in column (4) are again similar to 
those in column (2) except that instead of an FTA among MENA countries, there is free trade between 
each MENA country and the EU. Finally, in column (5) of Table 11 are projections of MENA trade 
flows for each of the four years assuming both a MENA FTA and one between MENA and the EU.  
These simulations dramatize the quite different patterns of trade implied by (or predicted by) rather 
extreme trade policy scenarios. They also show the effect on these patterns of introducing different 
controls or other modifications to the basic gravity model. The advantage of the gravity model is that it 
allows predictions to be made about bilateral trade patterns that depend essentially on exogenous 
factors like distance, border, access to the sea, area of the country, common language, and colonial 
background. However, from this point of view it would seem important to capture the influence of 
natural resource endowments that also are largely exogenous.  
IV. Caveats, Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Before concluding, some important caveats must be stated. First, it must be firmly stated that the 
simulations presented are not intended to be realistic. A full-fledged FTA between each MENA 
country and the EU is something that goes well beyond the most enthusiastic supporters of Euro-Med 
arrangements. So too, does the idea of an intra MENA FTA of the strength of other FTAs such as the 
EU, NAFTA and ASEAN, etc. Even more in the direction of ‘pie in the sky’ is the notion that one 
could have both a MENA-wide FTA and an FTA between the EU and MENA. These alternative 
scenarios are introduced only to identify the different directions that trade patterns might take as a 
result of extreme trade policy changes but otherwise based on gravity model considerations.  
Also no claim is made that the modified gravity model utilized in this paper represents the ultimate 
model of bilateral trade. Undoubtedly, further improvements can be and should be made. It would be 
useful, for example, to include natural resource endowments other than energy sources, and possibly 
other kinds of endowments. Yet, going much beyond the modified models used here will require a 
substantial improvement in the trade data base.  
Although some results are presented for the years 1995-97 which appear to be similar to those 
obtained for the period 1970-1992, this is a far cry from actually producing results form a consistent 
data base and model for the years 1970-2000 which would be highly desirable. To combine the two 
data sets not only should the trade and other data for recent years be deflated in ways to make them 
consistent with the constant price series used in this paper, but also a serious effort should be made to 
distinguish between missing trade data and zero trade in the earlier data set used in this study. These 
are ambitious tasks that unfortunately must remain for future research.  
Moreover, no claim is made to have uncovered the exact cause or causes of the shortfall in overall 
trade of MENA countries and especially that within the MENA region. Various reasons have been 
offered in the literature explain the low level of intra-regional trade in the Middle East. These are 
discussed in some detail in Miniesy, Nugent and Yousef (2001). One of these is trade policy itself (El-
Erian and Fischer 1996; El-Naggar 1992), the average tariff for the region as a whole being higher 
than that of any other region, except Africa.12 Non-tariff barriers are also extensive and many countries 
employ a variety of measures, including restrictive licensing, bans, state trading/monopolies, 
                                                     
12  The average tariff for Arab countries is estimated at about 17 percent. This compares to an average tariff of 20 percent for 
African countries, of 13 percent for Western Hemisphere countries, of 12 percent for Asia Pacific, of 10 percent for the 
Baltic, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union (BRO), and of 9 percent for Europe (excluding BRO). 
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restrictive foreign exchange allocation, and multiple exchange rates, to discourage imports. Another is 
that adherance to market mechanisms and development strategies vary considerably across countries 
(Allum 1998). Then there are the delays and costs involved in clearing customs and obtaining rebates 
in cases where trade taxes can be exempted when the final products are exported. Note, for example, 
that only 12 percent of the private firms doing business in the MENA region surveyed as part of the 
Worldwide Private Sector Survey used in the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report rated 
the ‘overall efficiency of the country’s customs services as good or very good’.13 Political differences 
and military conflicts among countries have also resulted in periodic boycotts, border closings, etc. 
(Limam and Abdalla 1999) and the enduring conflicts with Israel and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait have 
divided countries of the region and impeded their facilitation of trade and communications among 
each other. While among MENA countries as a whole, there is clearly considerable complementarity 
in resource endowments that should be trade promoting, at the sub-regional level in which such trade 
has been most intensive, the lack of product and resource complementarity has often been cited as an 
important factor hindering intra-Arab and inter-MENA trade (Fischer 1993). The relative similarity of 
resource endowments at the subregional level has made them competitors in the same product markets 
(e.g., in trade in oil, phosphates, petrochemicals, and agricultural products) rather than collaborators in 
international trade (Havrylyshyn, 1997).  
At the same time, the lack of a diversified export base—particularly in manufactures—limits the 
opportunities for trade based on product differentiation. Thus, even though in some product lines, such 
as oil, natural gas, phosphates, urea, cotton, and citrus, different Arab countries are producing similar 
goods, they are not manufactured goods and not product-differentiated goods. Hence, neither of two 
non-gravity models of international trade, the Heckscher-Ohlin model that bases trade on different 
factor endowments or the intra-industry model that bases trade on product differentiation, would seem 
to predict sizable amounts of intra-regional trade among Arab or MENA countries. Differences in per 
capita income have also been cited as a factor constraining intra-Arab trade (Fischer 1993; Zarrouk 
1992). Clearly, much more detailed analyses at the sectoral level, detailed analyses of customs 
procedures and political economy analyses would be needed to assess the relative importance of these 
different sources of intra-MENA trade shortfall 
Similarly, no claim is made that the demonstrated under-achievement of MENA countries in 
international trade relative to what might be expected has any necessary welfare implication. Tracing 
the welfare implications of this analysis is no easy task and it too must be left for future research 
Nevertheless, given that we have shown in Table 6 that the shortfalls in actual trade across countries 
and over time were at least partially attributable to tariff and other barriers to trade, this tends to 
mitigate the possibility that the differences could be due to measurement error and noise. Also, it 
should be recalled from our earlier discussion that Frankel and Romer (1999) used the predictions of a 
somewhat simpler version of the gravity model as a new, improved and more exogenous measure of 
openness which in turn was used to show that greater openness raises the level of income per capita. 
This implies that that tariff and other barriers to trade and transactions costs arising from any source 
may have the effect of reducing per capita income (or equivalently long run economic growth).  
The results of different specifications of the gravity model’s estimating equation have indicated 
that the predicted trade patterns tend to be quite sensitive to relatively small differences in 
specification of the estimating equations (1) and (2). The gaps between predicted and actual trade 
bilateral trade flows are also sensitive to the price of oil. Nevertheless, despite these sensitivities and 
caveats, some useful conclusions can be drawn.  
1. For 1992 at least and quite probably for 1995-97, the even withal the modifications to the 
gravity model undertaken, there is evidence that the MENA regions trades less tan it would be 
predicted to on the basis of the gravity model.  
                                                     
13  See Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997).  
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2. The biggest shortfall of actual relative to the predicted level of trade is with respect to 
intraregional trade. Trade with the EU is also well below what it would be predicted to be 
according to gravity considerations.  
3. The size of these gaps and the fact that the coefficients of dummy variables introduced into the 
estimating equations for Arab or MENA countries are typically negative suggest that MENA 
does defy gravity to a considerable extent.  
4. While the omission of natural resource endowments in existing applications of the gravity 
model contributes to the gap, it by no means eliminates it.  
5. Another factor that contributes to the gap would seem to be the trade diversion effects of FTAs 
like the EU. When these effects are accounted for, there is evidence that their influence falls 
disproportionately on the MENA region. This may not be so much as the FTA itself as the 
Common Agricultural Policy of the EU. Without out these trade diversion effects, gravity 
considerations would predict much larger trade between MENA and the EU than they do once 
these effects are included.  
6. A full-fledged FTA with the EU could have a very significant influence in part since this would 
eliminate these harmful trade diversion effects and add trade creation effects. This would have 
its influence only in a substantially reformed Common Agricultural Policy. At the same time, 
however, these arrangements would further exacerbate the shortfall in inter-MENA trade.  
7. Only by reducing the many subtle sources of transaction costs as well as formal barriers to 
trade among MENA countries can the intra-MENA shortfall be overcome.  
8. There is strong evidence from the bilateral trade regressions that the existing subregional trade 
arrangement such as the ACM, AMU and GCC have failed to increase trade. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Regression Coefficients Obtained for the Basic Gravity Model for Total Trade from 
Estimating Equation (1) for Different Samples 
TOTAL 
TRADE 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 Pooled 
Currency 
Union 
(CU) 
0.85** 1.26*** 1.08*** 1.33*** 1.50*** 1.89 0.92*** 
 (0.43) (0.41) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (1.42) (0.14) 
Exch. Rate -0.06*** 0.00 -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.04*** 
Volatility 
(V) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Output 0.77*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.83*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 
(lnYiYj) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ln YiYj/ 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.61*** 0.66*** 0.73*** 0.38*** 0.53*** 
POPiPOPj) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Distance 
(DIST) -1.09*** -1.15*** -1.02*** -1.05*** -1.12*** -1.09*** -1.09*** 
(LnDij) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Contiguity 0.48** 0.35* 0.72*** 0.51*** 0.63*** 0.26 0.56*** 
(Contij) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.08) 
Language 0.57*** 0.40*** 0.31*** 0.41*** 0.55*** 0.63*** 0.51*** 
(Lang) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) 
FTA 0.96*** 1.01*** 1.26*** 1.21*** 0.67*** 1.20*** 0.88*** 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.22) (0.08) 
Same 
Nation 1.72** 1.38** 1.05** 1.79*** 0.89* 1.41 1.60*** 
ComNat (0.71) (0.67) (0.45) (0.66) (0.52) (1.48) (0.26) 
Same 0.90*** 0.71*** 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.57*** 0.20 0.43*** 
Colonizer 
(ComCol) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.06) 
Colony 2.42*** 2.39*** 2.27*** 2.01*** 1.71*** 1.47*** 2.04*** 
  (0.22) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.07) 
Intercept -18.17*** -19.41*** -19.67*** -20.79*** -22.58*** -15.65*** -17.40*** 
 (0.68) (0.62) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.65) (0.25) 
No. of Obs. 4,052 4,474 5,092 5,091 4,239 4,343 27,291 
R2 
Adjusted 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.73 0.64 0.61 
RMSE 2.18 2.18 2.03 1.94 1.74 1.87 2.07 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses beneath the coefficients are standard errors. 
 ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable is the log of the value of trade between pairs of countries in the given years. 
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Table 2: Full Sample Panel Regressions of Basic Gravity Model with Added Variables Distance 
Squared (Ln D2), Landlocked (LL), Sum of the Areas (SAREA) 
 
ALL TRADE OIL TRADE NON-OIL TRADE 
Variable/Parameter 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
INTERCEPT -12.285 -18.17 -14.68 -9.75 -10.029 -13.08 
(LnYiYj) 0.864 152.16 0.337 23.44 0.892 156.62 
LnYiYj/POPiPOPj 0.068 9.39 0.227 12.08 0.033 4.62 
Ln Dij (DIST) -0.638 -3.72 2.01 5.2 -1.325 -6.87 
Ln D2 -0.023 -2.09 -0.214 -8.44 0.025 2.04 
Contij 0.876 10.83 0.794 5.74 0.803 9.89 
Langij 0.650 18.07 -0.07 -0.87 0.662 18.64 
FTAij 0.902 10.44 -0.126 -0.82 0.986 10.78 
ComNatij 1.254 5.11 0.271 0.51 1.791 5.95 
ComColij 0.588 12.99 1.44 11.2 0.531 11.80 
Colonyij 1.827 18.26 0.797 4.94 1.891 19.02 
CUij 0.760 5.58 -0.023 -0.08 0.932 6.13 
Vij -0.033 -21.68 -0.043 -10.59 -0.03 -20.49 
LL -0.619 -22.48 -1.840 -23.72 -0.483 -17.95 
LnSAREAij -0.144 -15.79 0.370 16.88 -0.181 -19.85 
N 35,621  23,787  34,845  
R2 Adjusted 0.604  0.248  0.617  
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Table 3: Smaller Sample Panel Regressions of Extended Gravity Model with Tariff Data 
 
ALL TRADE OIL TRADE NON-OIL TRADE 
Variable/Parameter 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
INTERCEPT -17.293 -15.04 -9.287 -3.56 -17.69 -14.80 
LnYiYj 0.848 106.13 0.454 21.91 0.87 109.31 
LnYiYj/POPiPOPj 0.061 5.75 0.140 4.82 0.027 2.58 
Ln Dij 0.612 2.13 0.095 0.14 0.612 2.05 
Ln D2ij -0.108 -5.93 -0.097 -2.29 -0.103 -5.48 
ComNatij 0.89 7.95 0.662 3.26 0.93 8.38 
Langij 0.644 14.52 0.200 1.87 0.64 14.60 
FTA 0.586 6.05 -0.154 -0.89 0.63 6.57 
ComColij 0.961 16.05 2.449 13.26 0.87 14.79 
Colonyij 1.805 15.11 0.998 4.84 1.85 15.70 
CUij 1.255 5.69 0.383 0.83 0.87 3.81 
Vij -0.0217 -12.26 -0.039 -7.59 -0.021 -11.93 
LLij -0.656 -17.75 -2.138 -19.88 -0.54 -14.90 
LnSAREAij -0.025 -1.85 0.329 10.17 -0.042 -3.11 
TARSij -0.03 -19.84 -0.0049 -1.19 -0.032 -21.63 
N 15,992  6589  15,734  
R2 Adjusted 0.690  0.307  0.700  
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Table 4: Larger Sample Panel Regressions of Extended Gravity Model with Variables for Oil 
Exports Included 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable/Parameter ALL TRADE OIL TRADE NON-OIL TRADE 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
INTERCEPT -11.689 -17.33 -10.461 -7.32 -9.824 -12.90 
LnYiYj 0.859 152.03 0.415 30.18 0.884 156.53 
LnYiYj/POPiPOPj 0.077 10.60 0.147 8.17 0.053 7.36 
Ln Dij -0.810 -4.74 0.788 2.14 -1.426 -7.45 
Ln D2ij -0.013 -1.22 -0.130 -5.38 0.029 2.36 
ComNatij 0.860 10.68 0.805 6.16 0.770 9.58 
Langij 0.682 18.96 0.189 2.42 0.668 18.96 
FTA 0.839 9.73 0.056 0.39 0.877 9.67 
ComColij 0.585 12.97 1.084 8.90 0.552 12.39 
Colonyij 1.853 18.80 0.914 6.08 1.902 19.52 
CUij 0.894 6.94 0.734 2.74 1.068 7.51 
Vij -0.034 -22.32 -0.039 -10.00 -0.032 -21.75 
LLij -0.661 -23.89 -1.552 -21.02 -0.573 -21.32 
SAREAij -0.127 -13.75 0.216 10.18 -0.142 -15.42 
ONEOIL -0.061 -2.33 2.280 39.53 -0.423 -16.47 
BOTHOIL -1.344 -17.47 -1.827 -10.21 -1.261 -16.78 
N 35,621  13,143  34,645  
R2 Adjusted 0.608  0.329  0.624  
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Table 5: Larger Sample Panel Regressions of Extended Gravity Model Allowing for Trade 
Diversion and Including Oil Export Variables 
Pooled 1970-1992 (1) ALL TRADE 
(2) 
ALL TRADE 
CU ij 0.680 0.789 
 (0.136) (0.137) 
V ij -0.034 -0.032 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
LnYiYj 0.863 0.868 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
LnYiYj/POPiPOPj 0.076 0.066 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln D ij -0.799 -0.628 
 (0.171) (0.171) 
Ln D2 ij -0.014 -0.024 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Cont ij 0.860 0.875 
 (0.081) (0.081) 
Lang ij 0.685 0.650 
 (0.036) (0.036) 
FTA 0.802 0.876 
 (0.087) (0.087) 
ComNat ij 1.301 1.277 
 (0.244) (0.245) 
ComCol ij 0.585 0.583 
 (0.045) (0.045) 
Colony ij 1.774 1.807 
 (0.100) (0.101) 
LL ij -0.654 -0.614 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
SAREA ij -0.130 -0.149 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
ONEOIL -0.058  
 (0.026)  
BOTHOIL -1.343  
 (0.077)  
ONEFTA -0.055 -0.045 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
ONECU 0.037 0.087 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
INTERCEPT -11.776 -12.353 
 (0.674) (0.676) 
N 35621 35621 
R2 Adjusted 0.608 0.604 
RMSE 2.052 2.061 
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Table 6: Panel Regressions for Equation (2) Version of Extended Gravity Model Allowing for 
Trade Diversion and Oil Export Dummy Variables 
Pooled 1970-1992 
 
(3) 
TRADE 
LESS GDP 
(4) 
TRADE 
LESS GDP 
(5) 
TRADE 
LESS GDP 
(6) 
TRADE 
LESS GDP 
CU ij 0.923 1.022 0.888 0.976 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) 
V -0.034 -0.033 -0.035 -0.034 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln D ij -0.741 -0.566 -0.755 -0.584 
 (0.172) (0.173) (0.172) (0.173) 
Ln D2 ij -0.018 -0.028 -0.018 -0.027 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Cont ij 0.789 0.806 0.792 0.807 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) 
Lang ij 0.798 0.758 0.805 0.767 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
FTA 0.709 0.772 0.762 0.830 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
ComNat ij 1.557 1.520 1.532 1.488 
 (0.246) (0.247) (0.246) (0.247) 
ComCol ij 0.726 0.734 0.748 0.755 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Colony ij 1.535 1.575 1.542 1.599 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.100) (0.101) 
LL ij -0.651 -0.613 -0.664 -0.625 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
SAREA ij -0.253 -0.265 -0.249 -0.262 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
ONEOIL -0.035  -0.048  
 (0.027)  (0.026)  
BOTHOIL -1.307  -1.326  
 (0.078)  (0.078)  
ONEFTA -0.112 -0.107   
 (0.023) (0.023)   
ONECU 0.134 0.174   
 (0.025) (0.025)   
INTERCEPT -13.789 -14.457 -13.792 -14.433 
 (0.664) (0.666) (0.664) (0.666) 
N 35621 35621 35621 35621 
R2 Adjusted 0.300 0.294 0.299 0.292 
RMSE 2.069 2.078 2.070 2.080 
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Table 8. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Gravity Model Using the Tobit Procedure (Arab 
countries as one group) 
 
Dependent 
Variable Imports Exports Trade 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Arab Dummy 
Variables       
 Arab1a 0.35 1.41 -0.82 -3.17 *** 0.19 0.83 
 Arab2b -1.17 -5.62 *** -1.12 -4.83 *** -0.88 -4.62 *** 
 Arab3c -0.65 -2.34 *** -0.26 -0.84 -0.42 -1.78 ** 
Proximity       
 Distance -1.01 -12.0 *** -1.34 -13.9 *** -1.01 -13.1 *** 
 Border 1.29 3.52 *** 0.611 2.5 *** 0.97 2.87 *** 
Reporter       
 GDPi 0.98 18.4 *** 1.08 20.14 *** 0.95 19.5 *** 
 GDPPCi 0.16 2.69 *** 0.32 5.12 *** 0.21 3.77 *** 
Partner       
 GDPj 1.25 25.4 *** 1.29 23.1 *** 1.14 25.3 *** 
 GDPPCj 0.16 3.27 *** -0.02 -0.4 0.11 2.39 *** 
Preferential       
 ASEAN 1.56 1.94 ** 2.02 2.16 *** 1.84 2.47 *** 
 EU -0.83 -2.53 *** -0.89 -2.4 *** -0.61 -2.05 ** 
Language       
 English 1.46 5.53*** 1.63 5.43 *** 1.49 6.1 *** 
 French 0.42 0.88 0.34 0.63 0.24 0.54 
Openness       
Reporter 
Country 0.24 1.53* … … 0.28 1.91 ** 
Partner Country … … -0.16 -0.96 -0.18 -1.37 * 
       
No.of countries 61  61  61  
Uncensored 
observations 3718  3718  3718  
S.E. 2.53  2.53  2.53  
Log-likelihood -2.35  -2.45  -2.29  
R2 61.4%  62.3%  62.7%  
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent level, respectively. 
a. If the reporting country is an Arab country; b If the reporting country is an oil exporting country and c If both countries are 
Arab countries  
Does MENA Defy Gravity? 
EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2005/26 © 2005 Jeffrey B. Nugent and Tarik M. Yousef 25 
Table 9. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Gravity Model Using the Tobit Procedure (Arab 
countries disaggregated into three groups) 
 
Dependent Variable Imports Exports Trade 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Arab Dummy 
Variables 1/ 
      
 AMU -1.79 -4.66 *** -1.6 -10.14 *** -1.48 -4.39 ***
 GCC -0.84 -2.41 *** -0.26 -0.66 *** -0.17 -1.55 * 
 Mashraq 0.79 2.04 ** 1.1 2.83 *** 0.54 1.86 ** 
       
Proximity       
 Distance -1.18 -8.19 *** -1.61 -10.13 *** -1.14 -9.1 *** 
 Border 1.34 2.16 *** 0.51 1.98 ** 0.97 2.87 *** 
       
Reporter       
 GDPi 1.12 14.33 *** 1.52 18.4 *** 1.57 17.86 ***
 GDPPCi 0.129 1.23 0.31 2.78 *** -0.05 -0.61 ** 
       
Partner       
 GDPj 1.55 19.5 *** 1.57 17.86 *** 1.14 25.3 *** 
 GDPPCj 0.2 2.47 *** -0.05 -0.61 0.11 2.39 *** 
       
Preferential       
 ASEAN 1.46 1.99 ** 2.37 1.58 ** 1.84 2.47 *** 
 EU -1.34 -2.42 *** 0.97 -1.61 ** -0.61 -2.05 ** 
 GCC -4.3 -3.5 *** -0.25 -0.66 -0.57 -0.84  
 AMU -0.27 -3.11 *** -1.43 -3.62 *** 2.05 2.42 *** 
 ACM 1.63 2.34 ***     
       
Language       
 English 1.76 3.91 *** 2.43 4.98 *** 1.49 6.1 *** 
 French 0.76 1.64 * 0.54 1.12 0.24 0.54  
       
Openness       
 Reporting Country 0.03 0.12 … … -0.04 -0.02 
 Partner Country … … -0.33 -1.24 * -0.39 -1.8 ** 
       
Number of countries 61  61  61  
Uncensored 
observations 
3718  3718  3718  
S.E. 4.2  4.6  3.79  
Log-likelihood -2.86  -2.9  -2.7  
R2 63.8%  64.1%  65.1%  
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent level, respectively. 1/ The regressions 
presented in this table do not impose any common dummy variables on the Arab countries as a whole. 
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Table 10: Comparisons of Actual and Predicted Levels of Bilateral Trade Flows Aggregated into 
Regions Under Different Modelling Assumptions and Trade Policy Scenarios Total Trade 
 
Region Year No. Obs. Actual Predicted 
   (1) 
(2) 
Base 
 
(3) 
Oil 
Dummies 
Included 
 
(4) 
Oil and 
One FTA 
and CU 
Dummies 
Included 
MENA 80 130 26,454 33,981 31,938 9576 
 85 109 7007 26,428 26,395 9040 
 90 120 6736 20,522 18,741 7623 
 92 86 6337 20,697 19,016 9465 
EU 80 246 314,313 162,893 119,927 74143 
 85 241 96,930 180,005 133,591 82780 
 90 234 75,777 221,559 165,057 97445 
 92 236 83,420 276,909 205,016 114136 
NAFTA 80 16 30,135 9265 5692 2602 
 85 20 8540 13271 8150 3541 
 90 20 7434 16,344 10,030 4343 
 92 16 6544 15,611 9618 4510 
OOECD 80 81 24,405 15,721 9844 4132 
 85 83 9691 19,517 12,144 5120 
 90 82 8805 24,911 15,431 6540 
 92 76 7044 25,000 15,526 6765 
LDCs 80 457 105,741 18,969 12,303 5901 
 85 462 32,107 23,280 15,016 7188 
 90 486 37,363 32,821 21,147 10124 
 92 435 37,606 37,784 24,320 12406 
EE 80 102 15,330 21,706 15,172 5832 
 85 89 11,002 19,368 13,461 5004 
 90 91 4241 10,826 7837 4534 
 92 82 2206 8811 6391 3795 
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Table 11: Comparisons of Actual and Predicted Levels of Bilateral Trade Flows Aggregated into 
Regions Under Different Modelling Assumptions and Trade Policy Scenarios Total Trade 
 
Region Year No. Obs. Actual Predicted 
   (1) 
(2) 
Oil and 
OneFTA 
and CU 
Dummies 
Included 
(3) 
Same as 
(2) but 
with 
MENA 
FTA 
(4)  
Same as 
(2) but 
with EU-
Med 
FTA but 
no 
MENA 
FTA 
(5)  
Same as 
(4) but 
with 
MENA 
FTA as 
well 
MENA 80 130 26,454 9576 21,347 9576 21,346 
 85 109 7007 9040 20,153 9040 20,154 
 90 120 6736 7623 16,694 7623 16,994 
 92 86 6337 9465 21,000 9465 21,100 
EU 80 246 314,313 74143 77,400 172,550 172,550 
 85 241 96,930 82780 86,512 192,865 192,865 
 90 234 75,777 97445 102,554 228,626 228,626 
 92 236 83,420 114136 120,156 267,867 267,867 
NAFTA 80 16 30,135 2602 2602 2602 2602 
 85 20 8540 3541 3713 3541 3713 
 90 20 7434 4343 4581 4343 4581 
 92 16 6544 4510 4755 4510 4755 
OOECD 80 81 24,405 4132 4267 4132 4266 
 85 83 9691 5120 5271 5120 5270 
 90 82 8805 6540 6718 6540 6718 
 92 76 7044 6765 6951 6765 6951 
LDCs 80 457 105,741 5901 5959 5901 5959 
 85 462 32,107 7188 7252 7187 7252 
 90 486 37,363 10124 10,230 10,124 10,230 
 92 435 37,606 12406 12,529 12,406, 12,529 
EE 80 102 15,330 5832 5831 5832 5832 
 85 89 11,002 5004 5004 5004 5004 
 90 91 4241 4534 4534 4534 4534 
 92 82 2206 3795 3796 3796 3796 
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Table 12: Comparisons of Actual and Predicted Levels of Bilateral Trade Flows for Total Trade 
in 1992 Under Different Modelling Assumptions, Trade Scenarios and Alternative Specifications 
than in Tables 10 and 11 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Actual Predicted Base 
Predicted 
With Oil 
Dummies 
and MENA 
FTA 
Predicted 
With Oil and 
Trade 
Diversion 
with 
EU-MENA 
Link 
Predicted 
With Oil 
and Trade 
Diversion 
with 
EU and 
MENA FTAs 
MENA1 6431 20697 33763 14067 33763 
MENA2 4968 10088 5056 5056 5056 
MENA3 284 1425 894 856 894 
EU 83931 276909 118450 284288 284288 
NAFTA 6620 15611 4736 4536 4736 
OOECD 7161 25000 7526 7345 7526 
LDCs 37826 37784 12750 12634 12750 
EE 
  
2220 
  
8811 
  
3693 
  
3693 
  
3693 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
